Opening remarks : global demographic change : economic impacts and policy challenges by Alan Greenspan
I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss the economic impli-
cations of population aging and to provide a general overview of some
of the issues that will be covered in much greater detail over the next
two days. 
The so-called elderly dependency ratio—the ratio of older adults to
younger adults—has been rising in the industrialized world for at
least 150 years. The pace of increase slowed greatly with the birth of
the baby-boom generation after World War II. But elderly depend-
ency will almost certainly rise more rapidly as that generation reaches
retirement age. 
The changes projected for the United States are not as dramatic as
those projected for other areas—particularly Europe and Japan—but
they nonetheless present substantial challenges. The growth rate of
the working-age population in the United States is anticipated to slow
from about 1 percent per year today to about 1⁄4 percent per year by
2035. At the same time, the percentage of the population that is over
65 is poised to rise markedly—from about 12 percent today to
perhaps 20 percent by 2035.
Alan Greenspan
Opening Remarks
1These anticipated changes in the age structure of the population
and workforces of developed countries are largely a consequence of
the decline in fertility that occurred after the birth of the baby-boom
generation. The fertility rate in the United States, after peaking in
1957 at about 31⁄2 births over a woman’s lifetime, fell to less than 2 by
the early 1970s and then rose to about 2.1 by 1990.1 Since then, the
fertility rate has remained close to 2.1, the so-called replacement
rate—that is, the level of the fertility rate required to hold the popu-
lation constant in the absence of immigration or changes in longevity.
Fertility rates in Europe, on the whole, and in Japan have fallen far
short of the replacement rate. The decrease in the number of children
per family since the end of the baby boom, coupled with increases in
life expectancy, has inevitably led to a projected increase in the ratio of
elderly to working-age population throughout the developed world.
The populations in most developing countries likewise are expected
to have a rising median age but to remain significantly younger and
doubtless will grow faster than the populations of the developed
countries over the foreseeable future. Eventually, declines in fertility
rates and increases in longevity may lead to similar issues with aging
populations in what is currently the developing world but likely only
well after the demographic transition in the United States and other
developed nations.
The aging of the population in the United States will significantly
affect our fiscal situation. Most observers expect Social Security,
under existing law, to be in chronic deficit over the long haul;
however, the program is largely defined benefit, and so the scale of the
necessary adjustments is limited. The shortfalls in the Medicare
program, however, will almost surely be much larger and much more
difficult to eliminate. Medicare faces financial pressure not only from
the changing composition of the population but also from continu-
ally increased per recipient demand for medical services. The
combination of rapidly advancing medical technologies and our
current system of subsidized third-party payments suggests continued
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tedly very difficult to forecast.
Although the sustainability of fiscal initiatives is generally evaluated
for convenience in financial terms, sustainability rests, at root, on the
level of real resources available to an economy. The resources available
to fund the sum of future retirement benefits and the real incomes of
the employed will depend, of course, on the growth rate of labor
employed plus the growth rate of the productivity of that labor. 
The growth rate of the U.S. working-age population is expected to
decline substantially over the next two decades and to remain low
thereafter. But the fraction of that population that is employed will
almost surely be affected by changes in the economic returns to
working and, especially for older workers, improvements in health.
Americans are not only living longer but also generally living
healthier. Rates of disability for those over 65 years of age have been
declining even as the average age of the above-65 population is
increasing. This decline in disability rates reflects both improvements
in health and changes in technology that accommodate the physical
impairments associated with aging. In addition, work is becoming
less physically strenuous but more demanding intellectually, continu-
ing a century-long trend toward a more-conceptual and less-physical
economic output. For example, in 1900, agricultural and manual
laborers composed about three-quarters of the workforce. By 1950,
those types of workers accounted for one-half of the workforce, and
though still critical to a significant part of our economic value-added,
today compose only about one-quarter of our workforce.
To date, however, despite the improving feasibility of work at older
ages, Americans have been retiring at younger ages. But rising pres-
sures on retirement incomes and a growing scarcity of experienced
labor could eventually reverse that trend.
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the decline of labor force growth in the United States. As the influx
of foreign workers that occurred in response to the tight labor
markets of the 1990s demonstrated, U.S. immigration does respond
to evolving economic conditions. But to fully offset the effects of the
decline in fertility, immigration would have to be much larger than
almost all current projections assume.
It is thus heightened growth of output per worker that offers the
greatest potential for boosting U.S. gross domestic product to a level
that would enable future retirees to maintain their expected standard
of living without unduly burdening future workers. Productivity
gains in the United States have been exceptional in recent years. But,
for a country already on the cutting edge of technology to maintain
this pace for a protracted period into the future would be without
modern precedent. One policy that could enhance the odds of
sustaining high levels of productivity growth is to engage in a long
overdue upgrading of primary and secondary school education in the
United States.
We obviously cannot attribute recent productivity trends to a high
level of national saving. Rather, the effectiveness with which we have
invested both domestic saving and funds attracted from abroad is the
apparent source of our decade-long rise in productivity growth. As I
have noted previously, the bipartisan policies of recent decades
directed at deregulation and increasing globalization and the innova-
tion that those policies have spurred have markedly improved our
ability to channel saving to its most productive uses, and as a byprod-
uct increased the flexibility and the resiliency of the U.S. economy.
It is, of course, difficult to separate rates of return based on the
innovations embedded in new equipment from the enhanced returns
made available by productive ideas of how to rearrange existing facil-
ities. From an accounting perspective, efficiency gains, broadly
defined as multifactor productivity, have accounted for roughly half
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accounts for most of the remainder.
All else being equal, domestic investment would raise future labor
productivity and thereby help provide for our aging population. But
the incremental benefit of additional investment may itself be
affected by aging. With slowed labor force growth, the amount of
new equipment that can be used productively could be more limited,
and the return to capital investment could decline as a consequence.
Yet it is possible that the return to certain types of capital—particu-
larly those embodying new labor-saving technologies—could
increase.
Although domestic investment has accounted for only half our recent
productivity gains, its contribution has historically been much larger.
Should the pace of efficiency gains slow, it would fall to the level of
investment to again become the major contributor to productivity
gains. Investment, however, cannot occur without saving. But main-
taining even a lower rate of capital investment growth will likely require
an increased rate of domestic saving because it is difficult to imagine
that we can continue indefinitely to borrow saving from abroad at a rate
equivalent to 5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product.
A key component of domestic saving in the United States in future
decades will be the path of the personal saving rate. That rate will
depend on a number of factors, especially the behavior of the
members of the baby-boom cohort during their retirement years.
Over the post-World War II period, the elderly in the United States,
contrary to conventional wisdom, seem to have drawn down their
accumulated wealth only modestly. Apparently retirees spend at a
lesser rate and save more than is implicit in the notion that savings are
built up during the working years to meet retirement needs. Perhaps,
people mis-estimate longevity or desire a large cushion of precaution-
ary savings. Moreover, often people bequeath a significant proportion
of their savings to their children or others rather than spend it during
retirement. If the baby-boom generation continues this pattern,
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Even so, critical to national saving will be the level of government,
specifically federal government, saving.
A doubling of the over-65 population by 2035 will substantially
augment unified budget deficits and, accordingly, reduce federal
saving unless actions are taken. But how these deficit trends are
addressed can have profound economic effects. For example, aside
from suppressing economic growth and the tax base, financing
expected future shortfalls in entitlement trust funds solely through
increased payroll taxes would likely exacerbate the problem of reduc-
tions in labor supply by diminishing the returns to work. By contrast,
policies promoting longer working life could ameliorate some of the
potential demographic stresses.
Changes to the age for receiving full retirement benefits or initia-
tives to slow the growth of Medicare spending could affect retirement
decisions, the size of the labor force, and saving behavior. In choosing
among the various tax and spending options, policymakers will need
to pay careful attention to the likely economic effects. 
The relative aging of the population is bound to bring with it many
changes to the economy of the United States—some foreseeable,
many probably not. Inevitably it will again require making difficult
policy choices to balance competing claims. The decade-long acceler-
ation in productivity and economic growth has seemingly muted the
necessity of making such choices. But, as I noted earlier, history
discourages the notion that the pace of growth will continue to
increase. Though the challenges of prospective increasingly stark
choices for the United States seem great, the necessary adjustments
will likely be smaller than those required in most other developed
countries. But how and when we adjust will also matter.
Early initiatives to address the economic effects of baby-boom
retirements could smooth the transition to a new balance between
workers and retirees. As a nation, we owe it to our retirees to promise
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than our economy has the ability to deliver to retirees without unduly
diminishing real income gains of workers, as I fear we may have, we
must recalibrate our public programs so that pending retirees have
time to adjust through other channels. If we delay, the adjustments
could be abrupt and painful. Because curbing benefits once bestowed
has proved so difficult in the past, fiscal policymakers must be espe-
cially vigilant to create new benefits only when their sustainability
under the most adverse projections is virtually ensured.
Responding to the pending dramatic rise in dependency ratios will
be exceptionally challenging for the policymakers in developed coun-
tries. While I do not underestimate the difficulties that we face in the
United States, I believe that, given the political will, we are better
positioned than most others to make the necessary adjustments.
Aside from the comparatively lesser depth of required adjustment,
our open labor markets should respond more easily to the changing
needs and abilities of our population; our capital markets should
allow for the creation and rapid adoption of new labor-saving tech-
nologies, and our open society should be receptive to immigrants.
These supports should help us adjust to the inexorabilities of an aging
population. Nonetheless, tough policy choices lie ahead. 
Endnote
1The fertility rate used here is the total fertility rate. It is measured as the average
number of children who would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she expe-
rienced the birth rates by age observed in any given year.
Opening Remarks 7